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COMMENTS
ABSENTEEISM DUE TO A WORK-
RELATED INJURY:
A CRITIQUE OF OHIO'S MOST RECENT
PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
INTRODUCTION
Workers' compensation laws were created to bring work-
places into compliance with the changes of the industrial revolu-
tion.1 On-the-job injuries became seen as inevitable occurrences in
modem industry for which workers should not have to bear all the
costs.2 Many states, including Ohio, have enacted workers' com-
pensation acts. 3 Several of these states have provided further pro-
tection for injured workers by outlawing employer retaliation
against injured employees who pursue workers' compensation
benefits.4 However, most courts have agreed that discharge pursu-
ant to a neutral absentee policy does not constitute retaliation.5 As
a result, the workers' compensation system creates a gap in protec-
1 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers' Compensation § 1 (2003) (citations omitted).
2 Id. (citations omitted).
3 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39A (West 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15 (West
2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123 (West 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN tit. 85 (West 1992);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51 (West 2002).
4 Some state legislatures have enacted anti-retaliation or anti-discrimination statutes. See,
e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39A, § 111 (West 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-39.1 (West
2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.90 (West 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN tit 85, § 5 (West
1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.48.025 (West 2002). In other states, courts have recog-
nized a common law cause of action in tort. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353,
357 (IM. 1978); Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Iowa 1988); Coleman v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 752 P.2d 645, 646 (Kan. 1988); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 245 N.W.2d 151,
153 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976); Wilmot v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 821 P.2d 18, 19
(Wash. 1991).
See, e.g., Finnerty v. Pers. Bd., 707 N.E.2d 600, 605 (Il. App. Ct. 1999); Duncan v.
N.Y. State Developmental Ctr., 470 N.E.2d 820, 822-23 (N.Y. 1984); Vance v. Parma Cmty.
Gen. Hosp., No. 53180, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 114, at *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 21, 1988).
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tion for injured workers. An employee cannot be discharged for
filing a workers' compensation claim after suffering a com-
pensable injury. However, if the employee's injury is severe, and
he is forced to take a large amount of time off to recover, he may
be discharged for violating the employer's neutral absentee policy.
Solving this problem involves balancing the competing interests
between employers and employees. On one hand, an employer can
only run an efficient workplace when its employees are present
and able to work. On the other hand, workers' compensation and
anti-retaliation laws were created so that injured employees can
obtain compensation without losing their employment.
Some courts have attempted to fill this gap by liberally inter-
preting anti-retaliation statutes.6 Other courts have ruled that the
practice violates established public policy.7 In October 2003, the
Ohio Supreme Court joined the minority of state courts and recog-
nized a public policy exception for employees who have been ab-
sent due to a compensable work-related injury. The court's deci-
sion in Coolidge v. Riverdale Local School District8 abruptly
changed decades of Ohio law as interpreted by lower courts. 9 The
decision is likely to have immediate effects upon employers, who
must change their employment policies to comply with the new
decision, and upon injured employees, who may now raise a new
cause of action after discharge.
This Comment argues that the Coolidge decision, while logi-
cally justifiable, is severely flawed. The many unanswered ques-
tions create such immense practical problems that court inaction
would have been preferable. Part I provides an overview of state
workers' compensation systems, highlighting their purposes and
common features. Part II outlines state approaches in prohibiting
retaliation for filing workers' compensation claims, including stat-
utory and common law tort. Part III outlines various state court
approaches to creating causes of action for workers discharged due
6 See, e.g., Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 586 P.2d 564, 570 (Cal.
1978); Griffin v. Eastman Kodak Co., 436 N.Y.S.2d 441, 441 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); La Dolce
v. Reg'l Transit Serv., Inc., 429 N.Y.S.2d 505, 505 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
7 See, e.g., Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 752 P.2d 645, 652 (Kan. 1988); Lindsay v.
Great N. Paper Co., 532 A.2d 151, 153 (Me. 1987).
8 797 N.E.2d 61 (Ohio 2003).
9 Ohio Courts of Appeal have held that discharge pursuant to a neutral absenteeism pol-
icy does not constitute retaliation. See, e.g., Anschutz v. Dresser Indus., Inc., No. 3-90-8, 1991
Ohio App. LEXIS 6124, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 11, 1991); Metheney v. Sajar Plastics, Inc.,
590 N.E.2d 1311, 1314 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Blair v. Milford Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Ed., 575 N.E.2d 1190, 1195 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); Barker v. Dayton Walther Corp., 564 N.E.2d
738, 740-41 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); Brown v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 9-86-20, 1987 Ohio App.
LEXIS 8534, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 1, 1987); Baker v. Culligan Water Conditioning, No.
CA 2133, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 8583, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 2, 1986).
1416 (Vol. 54:4
ABSENTEEISM DUE TO A WORK-RELATED INJURY
to absenteeism rather than retaliation. Part IV explains and ana-
lyzes the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Coolidge. Part V cri-
tiques the court's new public policy exception.
I. OVERVIEW OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LEGISLATION
A. Purposes
Workers' compensation legislation developed as a result of
industrial development in the United States.'0 The legislation's
purpose is to provide compensation to workers for "disability or
death resulting from occupational injuries or diseases."" Previ-
ously, injured workers were forced to rely on common-law reme-
dies as their only source of recourse. Negligence principles, how-
ever, were often unjust to the worker because of their complexity.
Such claims also added much expense and delay, forcing the in-
jured worker to bear the brunt of economic loss. 1 2 The new line of
legislative reasoning was that industrial accidents are inevitable
occurrences of modern industry, or inevitable "cost[s] of produc-
tion." 1 3 Therefore, injured accident victims should not face all of
the burdens associated with those accidents.'
4
Workers' compensation statutes do not rely on negligence or
on a theory of damages for a wrong. Instead, workers' compensa-
tion is a statutory scheme providing strict liability for employers to
compensate employees for work-related injuries. Workers' com-
pensation liability results from work connection, rather than from
fault. 5
B. Common Features
While workers' compensation laws vary among states, com-
mon features include the following:
(1) a right to compensation for all work-related injuries;
(2) abrogation of common-law negligence;
(3) a simple and inexpensive scheme for claim settlement;
(4) employer immunity from lawsuits, with certain excep-
tions;
10 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers' Compensation § 1 (2003) (citations omitted).
1 Id. § 5 (citations omitted).
12 Id. § 1 (citations omitted).
13 Id. §§ 1, 5 (citations omitted).
14 Id. § 1 (citations omitted).
'5 Id. (citations omitted).
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(5) a definite payment schedule of compensation, based on
an employee's loss of earning power; and
(6) payment for medical, surgical, hospital, nursing and bur-
ial services.
16
II. OUTLAWING RETALIATION
A. By Statute
Many state legislatures have enacted statutes that specifically
outlaw employer retaliation against employees who pursue work-
ers' compensation benefits.' 7 These statutes create necessary pro-
tection for the rights of injured employees. Ohio's statute is typi-
cal. It states:
No employer shall discharge, demote, reassign, or take any
punitive action against any employee because the employee
filed a claim or instituted, pursued or testified in any proceed-
ings under the worker's compensation act for an injury or oc-
cupational disease which occurred in the course of and aris-
ing out of his employment with that employer.
18
Without anti-retaliation laws, an employee may have a right to ap-
ply for workers' compensation; however, nothing would prevent
the employer from discharging or disciplining the injured em-
ployee for pursuing compensation. Facing this possibility, an em-
ployee may be less likely to pursue compensation, or even medical
attention, for his injuries. 19 Therefore, the purpose of these anti-
retaliation statutes is to avoid a chilling effect.2°
B. By Common Law Tort
Instead of, or in addition to, statutory protection, many courts
have ruled that an employee's discharge in retaliation for filing a
workers' compensation claim violates public policy.2 ' The tradi-
tional presumption is that all employment relationships are consid-
16 Id. § 6 (citations omitted). For examples of state workers' compensation laws, see su-
pra note 3.
17 See supra note 4.
1S OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.90 (West 2001). For examples of various state anti-
retaliation statutes, see supra note 4.
19 See Coolidge v. Riverdale Local Sch. Dist., 797 N.E.2d 61, 68 (Ohio 2003) ("[Plain-
tiffs] only recourse would have been to work despite his injury, an alternative clearly at odds
with the beneficent purposes of the Act.").
20 See Galante v. Sandoz, Inc., 470 A.2d 45, 48 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983) (noting
the employer's ability to chill employee's exercise of his rights).
21 See supra note 4 (listing cases that found a violation of public policy where an em-
ployer retaliates against an emoloyee for filing a workers' compensation charge).
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ered at-will, meaning that either party can terminate the relation-
ship at any time, with or without cause.2 2  This traditional pre-
sumption has been subject to some exceptions. For instance, ter-
mination is wrongful if it violates "a clear and substantial public
policy.
23
Although there is not one correct definition of "public pol-
icy," most courts agree that to find an exception, a right must be
"so substantial and fundamental that there can be virtually no
question as to [its] importance for promotion of the public good. 24
Courts will generally recognize public policies that are based on
prior statutes or judicial decisions. 25 Typically, public policy ex-
ceptions fit into one of three categories of employee conduct: "(1)
exercising a statutory right or obligation; (2) refusing to engage in
illegal activity; [or] (3) reporting criminal conduct to supervisors
or outside agencies. 26 For states that have enacted workers' com-
pensation statutes, a wrongful discharge claim based on retaliation
would fit into the first category.
In 1973, the Indiana Supreme Court was the first to hold that
the discharge of an employee in retaliation for filing a workers'
compensation claim violated public policy.27  Other courts have
followed its lead.2 8 A Kansas appellate court provided a very ra-
tional explanation for recognizing this public policy exception.
According to the court, workers' compensation laws were created
,,29to "provide[] efficient remedies and protection for employees.
The laws were designed to promote the general welfare of the peo-
ple in the state and are often the exclusive remedy for injured em-
ployees. Allowing an employer to influence an employee's free
exercise of these rights would be contrary to the purpose of work-
ers' compensation laws.3°
22 82 AM. JUR. 2D Wrongful Discharge § 2 (2003) (citations omitted).
23 Id. (citations omitted).
24 Id. § 54 (citations omitted); see also Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876,
878 (111. 1981) ("[Plublic policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens of
the State collectively. It is to be found in the State's constitution and statutes and, when they are
silent, in its judicial decisions."); Painter v. Graley, 639 N.E.2d 51, 56 (Ohio 1994) ("The exis-
tence of... public policy may be discerned by the Ohio judiciary based on sources such as the
Constitutions of Ohio and the United States, legislation, administrative rules and regulations,
and the common law.").
25 82 AM. JUR. 2D Wrongful Discharge § 54 (2003) (citations omitted).
26 Id. § 53 (citations omitted).
27 See Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973); see also Murphy
v. City of Topeka, 630 P.2d 186, 192 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981).
28 See supra note 4 (citing cases that found retaliatory discharge to be a violation of public
policy).
29 See Murphy, 630 P.2d at 192.
3 Id.
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Ill. ABSENTEEISM CAUSED BY A WORK-RELATED INJURY
An employee who suffers a serious work-related injury may
miss several days of work while recovering. If the employee com-
piles several months of absenteeism, the employer may discharge
the employee pursuant to its absentee policy. However, the em-
ployer will not violate the state's anti-retaliation statute because
the discharge is in response to chronic absenteeism in violation of
company policy, not to filing a workers' compensation claim. As
demonstrated below, a small minority of state courts recognize a
cause of action for injured workers who are absent due to a work-
related injury and subsequently discharged. Some courts have de-
cided that these situations fit within the liberally-construed lan-
guage of their anti-retaliation statutes. Other courts have decided
to create a public policy exception to protect these workers.
A. Statutory Interpretation-Minority View
Some courts have attempted to protect workers discharged
pursuant to an absentee policy by broadening their workers' com-
pensation statutes through liberal interpretation. In Lo Dolce v.
Regional Transit Service, Inc.,31 an employer discharged an em-
ployee because of absenteeism resulting from an employment-
related accident. New York's workers' compensation statute
stated that no employer could "discharge or in any manner dis-
criminate against an employee" for filing a worker's compensation
claim. 32 The New York Supreme Court ruled that the employer's
absenteeism policy "explicitly" violated the statute.33
In Griffin v. Eastman Kodak Co.,34 under similar facts, the
court clarified its stance. It ruled that the discharges in both the
present case, and in Lo Dolce, violated the law because they were
"triggered" by an absence due to a work-related injury. 35 Accord-
ing to the court, a contrary result would cause a chilling effect on
employees reporting injuries and receiving compensation.36 The
New York Court of Appeals disapproved of these results, stating
that such a broad interpretation "distort[s] the meaning and pur-
pose" of the statute.37
31 429 N.Y.S.2d 505 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
32 Id. at 505 (citing New York's workers' compensation statute).
33 Id.
- 436 N.Y.S.2d 441 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).35 ld. at 442.
36 Id.
37 Duncan v. N.Y. State Developmental Ctr., 470 N.E.2d 820, 822 (N.Y. 1984).
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In Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals
Board,38 an injured employee received workers' compensation
benefits under California law. His employer discharged him pur-
suant to a clause in the employee's union contract stating that an
employee shall be terminated when he has not performed any work
for twelve consecutive months. 39 A California statute prohibited
employers from discharging or discriminating against employees
who filed workers' compensation claims. 40  The court noted that
the California legislature had recently added another provision to
its workers' compensation act, which stated, "It is the declared
policy of this state that there should not be discrimination against
workers who are injured in the course and scope of their employ-
ment.",4' The court held that the situation in which an employee is
"penalized solely because he was injured on the job" fit within the
42scope of these provisions. The dissent argued that the majority
misinterpreted the statute. According to the dissent, it is difficult
to understand how an employer "discriminates" against an em-
ployee when it enforces a contract negotiated on the employee's
behalf by his union.43
B. Statutory Interpretation-Majority View
Most courts have strictly construed their state anti-retaliation
statutes. As a result, injured employees just beyond the reach of
anti-retaliation statutes have been without redress. Ohio's pre-
Coolidge law followed this pattern and was initiated by the Ohio
Supreme Court case Wilson v. Riverside Hospital.44 In that case,
an employer discharged an injured employee pursuant to its ten-
week leave of absence policy, and the employee challenged the
discharge under Ohio's anti-retaliation statute.45 While the Ohio
Supreme Court decided the case on a narrower issue,46 both the
dissenting and concurring judges agreed that terminations for law-
ful reasons, such as violation of a neutral absence policy, were not
covered under the statute.47 As a result, many lower appellate
38 586 P.2d 564 (Cal. 1978).
39 Id. at 566.
40 Id. (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a).
41 Id. (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a).
42 Id. at 569 (citations omitted).
43 See id. at 571 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
- 479 N.E.2d 275 (Ohio 1985).
45 Id. at 277; see also supra Part II.A (discussing Ohio's anti-retaliation statute).
46 See Wilson, 479 N.E.2d at 277 n.2 ("[W]e do not determine or consider the validity of
appellee's leave of absence policy for its employees as it relates to R.C. 4123.90.").
47 See id. at 277-78 (Wright, J., concurring) (stating that an absence policy "does not dis-
criminate on any basis."); id. (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[N]o employee is guaranteed to return to
his or her job if that employee's leave exceeds [the term in the leave of absence policy].").
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courts have used this language in support of the lawfulness of the
discharge of injured workers pursuant to absenteeism policies.48
Even though a provision in Ohio's workers' compensation act
states that it "shall be liberally construed in favor of employees, 49
most of Ohio's lower courts hold that an employer can lawfully
discharge an employee for any lawful reason, including pursuant to
a neutral attendance policy.50 According to these courts, not every
unfavorable action taken against an employee is covered under the
statute.5 1 An employee who files a workers' compensation claim
is not totally insulated from discharge.52 Instead, the statute is
strictly limited to protect those who have been demoted or dis-
missed because of a workers' compensation claim, not because of
a work-related injury.5 3 An employer must take a "punitive ac-
tion" against an employee for filing a claim.54 As a result, some
evidence of retaliatory motive must exist.
55
Somewhat contrary language appears in two Ohio cases. In
Caldwell v. Columbus Developmental Center,56 involving an in-
jured worker discharged for failing to submit leave of absence pa-
pers, the Tenth District Court of Appeals stated that "if an em-
ployee is off work because of an industrial injury and is unable to
return because of that injury, the employee does not need permis-
sion from the employer to be absent from work., 57 In Oil Chemi-
cal & Atomic Workers International Union v. RMI Co.,58 involving
whether the phrase "leave of absence" in a collective bargaining
agreement included leave due to a compensable injury, the Elev-
enth District Court of Appeals stated that public policy would not
"allow an employer to force a worker to choose between going
48 See, e.g., Vance v. Parma Cmty. Gen. Hosp., No. 53180, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 114,
at *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 21, 1988) (noting that at least two members of the Wilson court
believed a neutral absence policy did not constitute retaliation); Laithwaite v. Pizza Hut Hallich
Co., No. 85 C.A. 98, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 7950, at *6-8 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 19, 1986) (not-
ing that Wilson provides "guidance" on the issue).
49 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.95 (West 2001).
50 See supra note 9.
51 See Brown v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 9-86-20, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 8534, at *7 (Ohio
Ct. App. Sept. 1, 1987).
52 Markham v. Earle M. Jorgensen Co., 741 N.E.2d 618, 624 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
53 Blair v. Milford Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed., 575 N.E.2d 1190, 1195 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1989).
54 See Zazo v. City of Akron, 540 N.E.2d 733, 734 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
55 See Copper v. Buckeye Steel Castings, No. 92-3002, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 586, at *4
(6th Cir. Jan. 11, 1994); see also Laithwaite v. Pizza Hut Hallrich Co., No. 85 C.A. 98, 1986
Ohio App. LEXIS 7950, at *7-8 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 19, 1986).
56 547 N.E.2d 417 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
57 Id. at 419. The Sixth Circuit called this decision an "anomaly" in Ohio law. Copper,
1994 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *4.
58 534 N.E.2d 110 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
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back to work or being terminated., 59  These statements hint that
injured employees may be entitled to greater protection in Ohio
than the plain language of the anti-retaliation statute allows.
State courts in New York and Oklahoma, however, agree with
the majority of Ohio lower courts, interpreting similar anti-
retaliation statutes as requiring a causal connection between the
discharge and the filing of a workers' compensation claim.6° Some
courts have noted that this majority rule creates the potential for
employer abuse. 61  For example, employers may use their atten-
dance policies as pretext to discharge employees for filing a work-
ers' compensation claim. However, according to the courts, only
the legislature can broaden the statute if it wishes to protect these
62 63workers. The court's job is only to apply the statute as written.
C. Public Policy Exception-Majority View
The majority of courts have refused to find a public policy ex-
ception for absenteeism caused by a work-related injury. For ex-
ample, in Weinzetl v. Ruan Single Source Transportation Co.,
64
two employees were not released to return to work until ten
months after they were injured. The Iowa Supreme Court deter-
mined that the employer should be able to ensure a "steady, reli-
able, and adequate work force. 65 Therefore, such a lengthy ab-
sence would be too disruptive to the employer's business.66 Citing
the "weight of the authority," the court aligned itself with other
courts that have rejected a public policy exception. 67 State courts
in Michigan and New Jersey have issued similar rulings. 68
59 Id. at 114.
60 See Duncan v. N.Y. State Developmental Ctr., 470 N.E.2d 820, 822-23 (N.Y. 1984);
Pierce v. Franklin Elec. Co., 737 P.2d 921, 923-24 (Okla. 1987).
61 See Metheney v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 590 N.E.2d 1311, 1314 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) ("It
is certainly within the realm of possibility that an employer could discharge an employee under
the guise of an attendance policy when the company's actual motivation is to punish the worker
for filing a claim."); Zazo v. City of Akron, 540 N.E.2d 733, 734 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) ("The
potential for abuse in an absentee-control policy.., is noted.").
62 Baker v. Culligan Water Conditioning, No. CA 2133, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 8583, at
*2 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 2, 1986).
63 Metheney, 590 N.E.2d at 1314.
64 587 N.W.2d 809 (Iowa 1998).
6 Id. at 812.
6 Id. at 813.
67 Id.
68 See Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 353 N.W.2d 469, 471 (Mich. 1984) ("We cannot
agree... that an employee's protection from discharge in retaliation for filing a workers' com-
pensation claim necessarily includes protection from discharge because of an absence from
work because of a work-related injury."); Galante v. Sandoz, Inc., 470 A.2d 45, 49 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1983) ("[T]o expand the breadth of this statute.., is to confer upon the employee
a benefit not contemplated by the legislature; namely, unlimited absences from work with im-
punity.").
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D. Public Policy Exception-Minority View
At least two states recognize a public policy exception for dis-
charged employees with work-related injuries: Kansas and Maine.
In Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,69 the Kansas Supreme Court
recognized such a claim. 70 It stated that Kansas' workers' com-
pensation act was designed to promote the welfare of the state's
people. 7' Allowing employers to chill employees in exercising
72their rights would subvert the act's purposes. Therefore, state
public policy prohibited employers from even "indirectly" firing
employees for filing a workers' compensation claim.
73
In Lindsay v. Great Northern Paper Co.,74 the Maine Supreme
Court also recognized an absenteeism claim based on state policy.
The court stated that, in enacting the workers' compensation act,
the legislature recognized that "accidents are inevitable incidents
of modern industry" and that employees should not bear the bur-
den of those accidents. 75 According to the court, an injured em-
ployee must receive not only compensation, but also the necessary
time-off to complete recovery. Although the statutes did not ex-
plicitly recognize this latter right, the court held it was "implicit"
in the act.76
IV. THE COOLIDGE DECISION
A. Facts
Ohio recently joined the minority of courts to create protec-
tion for injured workers discharged due to absenteeism. In Coo-
lidge v. Riverdale Local School District,7 the court was faced with
a very sympathetic plaintiff. Coolidge was a continuing-contract
teacher who was assaulted and seriously injured by one of her stu-
dents.78 She remained off-work for over two years.79 Since the
date of the injury, Coolidge collected temporary total disability
69 752 P.2d 645 (Kan. 1988).
70 Id. at 652.
71 Id.
72 Id.; see also Clifford, 312 N.W.2d at 381 ("Permitting an employer to fire an employee
for absences due to a compensable claim... would have a chilling effect on the filing of such
claims. Public policy, therefore, dictates the opposite result.").
73 Coleman, 752 P.2d at 652.
74 532 A.2d 151 (Me. 1987).
75 Id. at 153.
76 Id.
77 797 N.E.2d 61 (Ohio 2003).
78 Id. at 62.
79 Id. at 62-63.
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("TTD") compensation under Ohio law.80 The school board voted
to terminate her contract because she had exhausted all leave and
was unable to perform her teaching duties .8 At a hearing re-
quested by Coolidge, the referee determined that Ohio law allowed
employers to terminate teachers for "other good and just cause." 82
The referee found that "other good and just cause" included absen-
teeism even if due to a compensable injury. 3
B. Precedent-Or Lack Thereof
Coolidge conceded that the employer's conduct did not fall
within Ohio's anti-retaliation statute. 4 Therefore, in order for her
to be protected, the Ohio Supreme Court had to carve out a public
policy exception. 5 The court recognized that Ohio law previously
86ran counter to this line of reasoning, but cited approvingly the
language from Caldwell v. Columbus Developmental Center87 and
Oil Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union v. RMI Co., 88
which hinted at public policy protection for injured employees
with chronic absenteeism. s9 The court also cited approvingly lan-
guage from other state court decisions, including Coleman (Kan-
sas) and Lindsay (Maine), that have recognized public policy ex-
ceptions.90 The court declared that these positions are more con-
sistent with the purposes of the workers' compensation laws. 91
The court held that a contrary view would produce an "anomalous"
result: an employer could not fire an employee for pursuing a
claim but could fire the employee for the absenteeism that enables
him to receive the compensation in the first place.92
80 Id. at 63; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.56 (West 2001) (setting forth the re-
quirements for receiving temporary total disability compensation).
81 Coolidge, 797 N.E.2d at 63.
82 Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.16 (West 1999) (which governs the board of
education's termination of teachers' contracts)).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 65.
85 Ohio has recognized public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine since
the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc.,
551 N.E.2d 981 (Ohio 1990).
86 Coolidge, 797 N.E.2d at 65-66.
87 547 N.E.2d 417 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
8 534 N.E.2d 110 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
89 Coolidge, 797 N.E.2d at 67-68.
90 Id. at 66-69.
9' Id. at 68.
92 Id. at 69.
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C. Public Policy Support
The court used two Ohio statutes as public policy support.
The first source of policy was Ohio's anti-retaliation statute.9 The
court stated that the basic purpose of a retaliation statute is to al-
low employees to exercise their rights to compensation without
fear of employer retribution.94 Employers must not force an em-
ployee to choose between applying for benefits and retaining his
job.95 The court argued that the same type of coercion exists with
absenteeism due to a work-related injury, except an employer
forces an employee to choose between enjoying benefits and re-
taining his job.96
The second source of public policy was the Ohio statute that
provided TTD compensation.97 The court stated that the basic
purpose of TTD compensation was to "compensate an injured em-
ployee for the loss of earnings that he or she incurs while the in-
jury heals. 98 Allowing an employer to discharge such a worker
because of the compensable disability would be inconsistent with
this purpose. 99
D. Notable Aspects
One notable aspect of the Ohio Supreme Court's decision is
the breadth of its public policy exception. While a public policy
exception is an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, in
Coolidge, the court applied the public policy exception to a teacher
covered under a collective bargaining agreement.' °° Other courts
are less generous in applying public policy exceptions. For exam-
ple, Pennsylvania courts only recognize a wrongful discharge pub-
lic policy exception for at-will employees.10' One Pennsylvania
court reasoned that its public policy exception was created to pro-
vide a remedy for employees with no other recourse. 10 2 Public pol-
icy also favors the right of parties to enter into contracts.
10 3
Furthermore, other state courts that have recognized protec-
tion for workers absent due to a work-related injury, including
93 Id.; see supra Part l.A (discussing Ohio's anti-retaliation statute).
94 Coolidge, 797 N.E.2d at 69.
95 Id. (citing 82 AM. JUR. 2D Wrongful Discharge § 93 (2003)).
96 Id.
97 See id.; see also Olo REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.56 (West 2001).
98 Coolidge, 797 N.E.2d at 69.
99 Id.
IM Id. at 65; see also Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 752 P.2d 645, 653 (Kan. 1988) (ap-
plying the exception to an employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement).
101 See Phillips v. Babcock & Wilcox, 503 A.2d 36, 38 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
102 Id.
103 Id.
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California,104 Maine, 10 5 and Kansas,10 6 have limited such protection
to workers who are able to return and perform the functions of
their jobs. The Coolidge court neglected to set any limits on how
long an employee can remain absent before an employer can law-
fully discharge him.
Another notable aspect of the Coolidge decision is the court's
expansion of its basic holding. In dicta, the court disapproved of
certain seemingly "independent grounds" for discharge other than
absenteeism. 0 7 The court stated that an employee receiving tem-
porary total disability compensation "may not be discharged for
failing to complete forms required for a leave of absence, or for
failing to notify his or her employer as to the length of the ab-
sence, where the employer is otherwise on notice of the em-
ployee's condition and status."'
0 8
While not explicitly placing any limits on its decision, the
court's holding contains at least three implicit limitations. First,
the exception only applies when an employee is discharged. °9 In
contrast, Ohio's anti-retaliation statute protects workers from not
only discharge but also demotion, reassignment, or any other puni-
tive action."0 Second, the exception applies only to an employee
discharged after receiving TTD compensation under Ohio law."'
Therefore, it would not cover employees receiving other forms of
compensation. Third, the exception applies only to discharges
based solely on absenteeism or inability to work. 12 Therefore, if
the employer has reasons for termination other than absenteeism,
failure to complete required forms, or failure to provide notice, the
employer may lawfully discharge the employee.
1See Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 586 P.2d 564, 569 (Cal. 1978)
(noting that the statute "does not compel an employer to ignore the realities of doing business by
'reemploying' unqualified employees or employees for whom positions are no longer avail-
able").
05 See Jandreau v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., 837 A.2d 142, 146 (Me. 2003) ("Neither
the Act nor our decisions require an employer to keep an employee on the books indefinitely
when the employee can no longer meet the requirements of a job.").
1°6See Rowland v. Val-Agri, Inc., 766 P.2d 819, 822 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988) ("[T]he factual
situation herein is substantially different from that in Coleman where the plaintiff could return
to her job.").
107 Coolidge, 797 N.E.2d at 70.
10a8 d.
109 See id. at syllabus.
"')See OrIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.90 (West 2001).
1 Coolidge, 797 N.E.2d at syllabus.
112 See id.
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V. A CRITIQUE OF COOLIDGE
A. Coolidge Is Theoretically Defensible
Consider the following simplified hypothetical: A seriously
injured employee is forced to take several months off to recover
from his injury. His employer fires him for violating its neutral
absenteeism policy. The Ohio General Assembly has not offered
the employee any protection from losing his job, so the court steps
in to protect him. Ignoring the practical consequences of Coolidge
for the time being, the court's decision appears to be a very gener-
ous and logical extension of workers' compensation rights for in-
jured workers.
1. The Court Has the Authority to Declare Policy
One argument against the Coolidge decision is that the Ohio
Supreme Court overstepped its bounds by creating a new cause of
action. In fact, many state courts specifically reject any role in
creating public policy exceptions to the employment at-will doc-
trine."13 According to this view, the job of the legislature is to cre-
ate policy; the judicial branch is only supposed to interpret and
apply the law as written.1 4 If the legislature had wanted to protect
chronically-absent injured workers, it would have written explicit
protection for them into the anti-retaliation statute. Plus, lower
courts have been deciding cases involving chronically-absent em-
ployees since the early 1980s. The legislature was certainly aware
of the issue. If the legislature wanted to protect these workers, it
could have easily amended the statute.
However, many states, including Ohio, recognize that the ju-
dicial branch plays a role in deciding public policy. 115 According
to the Ohio Supreme Court, "[t]he existence of ... public policy
may be discerned by the Ohio judiciary based on sources such as
the Constitutions of Ohio and the United States, legislation, ad-
ministrative rules and regulations, and the common law."'1 6 Fur-
ther, the court has noted that "when the common law has been out
of step with the times, and the legislature, for whatever reason, has
"1 See, e.g., Gil v. Metal Serv. Corp., 412 So. 2d 706, 708 (La. Ct. App. 1982) ("Broad
policy considerations creating exceptions to employment at will and affecting relations between
employer and employee should not be considered by this court.").
114 See, e.g., Metheney v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 590 N.E.2d 1311, 1314 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)
("[I]t is the job of this court to apply the law as written.").
15 See Coolidge, 797 N.E.2d at 64 ("[N]o principle of judicial restraint.., requires courts
to refrain from deciding public-policy questions.").
116 Painter v. Graley, 639 N.E.2d 51, 56 (Ohio 1994) (emphasis added).
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not acted, we have undertaken to change the law, and rightfully so.
After all, who presides over the common law but the courts?"'"1 7 If
the legislature wanted to limit the role of the courts in creating
public policy exceptions, it could have taken the same action as the
legislature in Alabama, which has specifically codified only two
exceptions to the employment-at-will presumption.'
8
One can argue that the court's lack of balance in Coolidge
was flawed because the court favored seriously injured workers
over an employer's business interests. Had the legislature consid-
ered this question, it may have balanced employee and employer
interests more carefully. However, nothing dictates that legisla-
tures have to create totally balanced legislation. The court's deci-
sion was a legitimate policy choice within the realm of possible
policy choices.
2. Change in the Law Is a Certainty
Another argument against the Ohio Supreme Court's decision
is that even if the court can create public policy, it should refrain
from doing so to avoid creating great uncertainty in the law. Ohio
businesses have relied on previous workers' compensation law for
nearly two decades and have expended resources in creating em-
ployee handbooks and policies to comply with that law. The Ohio
Supreme Court's new decision will cause employers to expend
more resources to conform to the new policy.
Before Coolidge, only statutes governed Ohio's workers'
compensation system. Therefore, it was a relatively stable area of
law. However, employment law in general is less stable. New
employment laws always create change, whether created by the
legislature or the court. For example, employers all over the coun-
try must keep up-to-date with changes in federal employment prac-
tices based on U.S. Supreme Court decisions, congressional legis-
lation, and administrative agency rules and adjudications, as well
as state employment practices based on state supreme court deci-
sions, state legislation, and state administrative agency regulations.
Updating employee handbooks, workplace policies, and training
methods is a legitimate and foreseeable cost of doing business for
the modern employer. Thus, the Coolidge decision does not create
any new burdens for employers.
117d. (quoting Gallimore v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052, 1059 (Ohio
1993)).
's See ALA. CODE § 12-16-8.1 (1995) (outlawing discharge for serving on a jury); ALA.
CODE § 25-5-11.1 (2000) (outlawing discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim).
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3. Coolidge Is a Logical Extension of Workers' Compensation Laws
The court's decision furthers the goals of workers' compensa-
tion laws and is a logical extension of the anti-retaliation statute.
The Ohio Constitution authorizes a system to "provid[e] compen-
sation to workmen and their dependents, for death, injuries or oc-
cupational disease, occasioned in the course of . . . employ-
ment." 1 9 As indicated above, the Ohio legislature enacted statutes
entitling injured employees to compensation and protecting their
ability to apply for it without fear of discharge.120 It is logical for
the court to conclude that an injured employee entitled to compen-
sation should also be able to enjoy the compensation without fear
of discharge.
B. Coolidge Is a Practical Nightmare
In theory, Coolidge is defensible. In application, it is a night-
mare. The unanswered questions that linger after the court's deci-
sion have serious consequences for Ohio employers. As a result,
the court should have either declined to create the public policy
exception or at least severely limited its holding to avoid major
damage.
1. Statute of Limitations
Under Ohio's workers' compensation anti-retaliation statute,
workers must satisfy two jurisdictional conditions before filing a
complaint.'12  First, workers must provide their employer with
written notice of an alleged violation within ninety days following
the retaliatory action. 122  Second, the employee must file a com-
plaint within 180 days of the retaliatory action. 12 3  This statute
carefully balances the interests of the employer and the employees.
The legislature granted the employees the benefit of a cause of ac-
tion but placed limits on its application for the employer's benefit.
In Coolidge, the court did not specify what type of statute of
limitations should govern its new public policy exception. Under
Ohio law, the statute of limitations for bringing an action for
wrongful termination in violation of public policy is four years.1 24
'
9 OHIO CONST. art. IH, § 35.
120 See supra Parts I.A and lI.
121 See Cross v. Gerstenslager Co., 580 N.E.2d 466, 467 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) ("Compli-
ance with the time of filing, the place of filing, and the content of the notice as specified in the
statute are all conditions precedent to jurisdiction.").122 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.90 (West 2001).
123 See id.
124 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.09(D) (West 1994) ("An action ... for an injury to
the rights of plaintiff not arising on contract... shall be brought within four years after the
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Since Coolidge involves a wrongful termination tort, the statute of
limitations must be four years. Yet, the court in Coolidge took
great efforts to demonstrate how employer coercion involving ap-
plication for benefits (retaliation situation) and enjoying benefits
(absenteeism situation) were virtually the same. 125 However, dis-
charge due to retaliation is arguably more egregious than discharge
due to a neutral absenteeism policy because employers have a
harmful motive. Therefore, it is illogical and ill-considered to al-
low the statute of limitations for this new cause of action to be as
lengthy as the statute of limitations for a retaliation cause of ac-
tion.
2. Prospective or Retrospective Application
The court in Coolidge did not declare when its public policy
exception applied. Many stages of litigation exist in which the
new decision could apply. For instance, the decision could apply
to (1) only new cases initiated after the decision; (2) only new
cases and cases in a specified stage of litigation; (3) new cases and
all cases still pending at the time of the decision; or (4) all cases
regarding the issue, past, present, and future.
The United States was founded with suspicion towards retro-
active legislation.12 6 The reasoning is that people should be gov-
erned by the law in effect at the time of their actions. This gives a
person the opportunity to bring his behavior in accordance with the
law. 1 27 If the Ohio legislature drafted a statute to protect injured
employees discharged for absenteeism, the Ohio Constitution
would require the statute to apply only to future employer con-
duct. 28 A common law cause of action, however, does not contain
this limitation. When one considers the possible real world conse-
quences of Coolidge's retroactive application, employers across
the state could face serious harm.
For example, before Coolidge, employers relied in good faith
on previous Ohio law that allowed discharge of injured employees
cause thereof accrued.").
'2 Coolidge, 797 N.E.2d at 69.
126 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994):
ITihe presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurispru-
dence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Elementary
considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to
know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations
should not be lightly disrupted.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
127 See id.
128 See OHIO CONST. art. 1I, § 28 ("The General Assembly shall have no power to pass ret-
roactive laws.").
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for violating a neutral absenteeism policy. Many employers were
likely involved in retaliation litigation while the Ohio Supreme
Court decided Coolidge, and these cases may still be involved in
litigation. After Coolidge, can plaintiffs now amend their com-
plaints to take advantage of the new cause of action? What about
employees terminated years ago who had no cause of action at the
time? Will employers suddenly be flooded with claims from all
discharged employees in the past four years who were previously
lawfully discharged pursuant to applicable law? Although these
possibilities may not strongly affect small employers, large em-
ployers, who have fired hundreds of employees within the last four
years according to neutral employment policies, face a very fright-
ening prospect if they are found liable for previously lawful con-
duct.
3. Available Remedies
The Coolidge court also neglected to set forth the remedies
available after a successful claim. Under Ohio's anti-retaliation
law, a successful plaintiff can obtain only reinstatement with
backpay and reasonable attorney fees. 129 However, common law
tort remedies can run the full gamut of damages, including puni-
tive and compensatory damages. In Coolidge, the court ordered
that employee's teaching contract be "restored to its previously
effective status."'130 This, in effect, is reinstatement. Is an em-
ployee entitled to tort remedies in addition to reinstatement or only
to the anti-retaliation remedies under Ohio statute?
More seriously, assume that an employer loses a Coolidge
claim to several former employees who were discharged within
that last four years. Assume further that the judge orders rein-
statement of some or all of them. How must the employer accom-
modate these employees? Must the employer reinstate them to
their former positions? What is the employer's required response
when the positions are filled or no longer exist? Lower courts
should expect to keep busy with litigation for the next decade at-
tempting to answer these questions and more.
CONCLUSION
Workers' compensation laws reflect sound and decent public
policy to provide for employees injured in the course of their em-
ployment. Anti-retaliation laws are a necessary extension of
129 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.90 (West 2001).
130 Coolidge, 797 N.E.2d at 71.
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workers' compensation laws. The effectiveness of workers' com-
pensation is hampered unless employees can freely pursue their
entitled benefits. However, anti-retaliation laws do not solve all of
the problems in this area. The effectiveness of workers' compen-
sation is also hampered unless employees can freely enjoy their
entitled benefits. Therefore, protecting seriously injured employ-
ees from discharge while they are recovering is another logical
extension of workers' compensation laws.
The Ohio legislature should have extended its anti-retaliation
statute to protect these workers. Had it done so, it could have con-
sidered the various issues left unanswered by the Coolidge deci-
sion and could have created a fair, balanced, and workable solu-
tion. The Ohio legislature is most likely unwilling to address this
problem, at least in the near future. In certain instances, the Ohio
Supreme Court should step in to protect individuals when the leg-
islature is unresponsive. In this case, however, the Ohio Supreme
Court's action creates more problems than it solves. Had the court
answered these questions, its holding would have resembled a
complex statutory scheme, which of course only the General As-
sembly has the authority to draft. Therefore, the state would have
been better served if the court had not acted at all.
The Ohio Supreme Court recently refused reconsideration of
its Coolidge decision.131 While the court may not be willing to
back down on its holding, the court should prepare for an influx of
litigation aimed at clarifying it.
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13' Coolidge v. Riverdale Local Sch. Dist, 802 N.E.2d 155 (Ohio 2004).
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